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Abstract
This paper studies the Spanish Underground economy by estimating its size
and trend with a Bayesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
approach for the period 1980:Q1-2015:Q4. I found that the Spanish shadow
economy has a large variation, ranging from a minimum of 16% to a maximum of
more than 35%, over the whole period due to its labor dependency. Particularly,
it suffers a strong decrease at the beginning of the financial crisis, followed by a
continuous growth until year 2016. Regarding to the fiscal policy analysis, the
estimated results suggest that Spain can increase its fiscal revenues by raising
both corporate tax rate and household income tax rate, but with an important
negative effect over social security contributions. Finally, a sensitivity analysis
of the model estimation indicates that the potential gains of increasing the cost
of supplying labor to the irregular production overcome the increase in fiscal
revenues from a tax rise.
1 Introduction
The underground economy is an important issue for a large number of countries
around the world and, as emphasized by Schneider (2000) it was taking a major
influence on the world economy. This is due to its harmful effects for those
countries with a high level of irregular economy, which can be summarized in
the followings points as it shows in Arrazola et al. (2011): (1) the shadow
economy generates inequality problems, (2) raises problems of efficiency, (3)
produces a decrease in tax revenue, (4) distorts business competition and (5)
makes data less reliable. Obviously, consequences 1-4 generate a decrease in
social welfare, but the fifth problem could be as important as the previous ones,
not only due to its effects on economic research, but also due to its effects on
economic and fiscal policies 1.
In this regard, it is important to list the causes of the underground economy,
i.e. those factors that determine its size and trend. This is a significant issue
because it can help us to better understand the behavior and influence of the
1The resulting optimal policy could be very different if we take into account the existence
of an irregular production sector or not. This is highlighted in Orsi et al. (2013), they show
that the resulting optimal fiscal policy for the Italian economy changes taking into account
the shadow economy.
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Table 1: Underground Economy
Median (%) Minimum (%) Maximum (%) Billions of euros
Germany 15.9 13.3 17.7 5557
United Kingdom 13.1 11.7 15.8 3471
France 15.8 14.0 18.2 393
Italy 29.0 26.8 33.5 537
Spain 25.6 22.7 28.7 321
Netherlands 14.0 13.0 16.0 108
Switzerland 9.1 8.0 10.0 60
Sweden 19.2 16.7 24.5 99
Belgium 23.4 21.6 25.8 110
Poland 27.5 19.1 34.5 129
Table 1: Size of the Underground economy for the top ten economies in the European Union.
Column 1-3 display the median, minimum and maximum value of the underground economy as
percentage of total output. Column 4 presents the size of the informal economy measured in
billions of euros.
irregular production in an economy. There are six main causes identified by
Schneider and Buehn (2013) that trigger movements in the underground econ-
omy: tax burden, quality of the institutions, regulation, public sector services,
tax moral and deterrence. Taking into account these aspects, in this paper I
build a DSGE model for the Spanish economy that explicitly consider the ex-
istence of underground sector and tax evasion with the final goal of estimating
their importance for the Spanish economy. Particularly, as a novelty in this
type of model and following Anzoategui (2016), I use mixed frequency data by
including annual information about the social security contributions in Spain
and tax enforcement activities by the government, together with quarterly data
of consumption, investment, wages and fiscal revenues. Social security contri-
butions are included in order to control for the most important variable in ex-
plaining the existence of the underground sector whereas, I include the intensity
of firm’s inspections to cover two causes, regulation and deterrence. Secondly,
public sector services are somehow reflected in the model by the parameter that
symbolizes the utility cost of working in the underground sector. For simplicity,
I omit parameters that reflect the quality of the institutions due to the lack of
data and the subjective meaning of this cause 2.
The underground economy in Spain is a particularly important issue, due
to its size and historical persistence. In the European Union, Spain is among
the economies with the highest levels of underground economy measured as
a percentage of the GDP (Medina and Schneider (2017)), as it is shown in
Table 1, which provides estimates of the underground economy for the top ten
economies in the European Union. More precisely, table 1 displays the median,
2It is possible and relatively simple to consider this issue by introducing a parameter that
reflects public corruption as it is shown in Pappa et al. (2014).
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minimum and maximum value of the informal economy for the period 1991-
2015. As we can see, Spain is the third country with higher shadow economy in
the top ten European economies, preceded only by Italy and Poland. In terms
of GDP the irregular economy represents 320 billions of euros, a quantity that
exceeds Spanish total fiscal revenues in the year 2017 (292 billions of euros).
These results highlight the importance of the underground economy in Spain
and motivate the analysis of the variables that affect its trend and variation
with the final goal of choosing proper fiscal and economic policies. Therefore,
this study tries to give an estimation of the irregular economy and its dynamic,
along with the main variables that explain its behavior for the period 1980:Q1-
2015:Q4, by estimating a two sector Dinamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model with a bayesian approach.
Regarding the Spanish irregular economy, there are several methods that es-
timates its size for Spain, the most important ones are presented by Jime´nez and
Mart´ınez-Pardo (2013), Pickhardt and Sarda´ (2015) and Medina and Schneider
(2017) among others. All the available methods used for estimating the Span-
ish Underground economy are base in statistics approaches and the existent
data, without taking into account any assumption about the rational behavior
of agents. Therefore, it is not possible to apply a proper fiscal policy analysis
that helps to reduce the size of the informal economy. This study tries to give
an answer to this problem following the approach pursued in Orsi. et al (2013),
where they estimate the Italian informal economy using a two sector DSGE
model with three types of agents: households, firms and government. For Spain
I use a similar model with different assumptions about the irregular production
functional form and the input used in this sector, adding habit formation in the
household utility and capital adjustment cost. Also, I execute a deep analysis
of the effects of corporate tax rate and household income tax rate on social se-
curity fiscal revenues, due to its importance in maintaining social expenditures
like pensions or unemployment benefits among others.
The motivation of this analysis comes from the fact that there is a slow re-
covery of the social security contributions as it is shown in Table 2. Particularly,
first column presents the dates in which social security contributions and fiscal
revenues from corporate taxation reach their maximum levels. Second and third
columns show the minimum level of the variables and their levels in the fourth
quarter of 2015, respectively. Finally, last column displays the average growth
rate in the period 2013:Q1-2015:Q4 for both social security contributions and
firms fiscal revenues. There is a larger variation on fiscal revenues from cor-
porate tax rate than for social security contributions, but taking into account
the actual level of both variables we can see a belated recovery of the second
variable, which is 8 percentage points lower than in 2008:Q1. Also, Table 2
presents the average growth rate of both, social security contributions and cor-
porate fiscal revenues, showing that social security fiscal revenues growth rate
is much more lower than its homologous case.
Therefore, there is a late recovery of social security contributions that hurts
the Spanish social system, which nowadays has an important deficit and needs
from other resources to finance crucial social expenditures in terms of social
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Table 2: Fiscal Revenues Dynamics
Maximum Minimum 2015:Q4 Average Growth Rate
Level=100% Level (%) (%) (2013:Q1-2015:Q4)
S. S. Contributions 2008:Q2 87.75 92 0.27
Firms Fiscal Revenues 2006:Q4 65.65 94.75 1.30
welfare. Consequently, it needs from a special control of its behavior and the
indirect effects that comes from other fiscal policies.
Moreover, since fiscal policy affects the economics decisions of individuals
and firms, it has an important impact on the size of the underground economy
as it is shown by Orsi et al. (2013), Busato and Chiarini (2004,2013) among
others. For this reason, I analyze the effects of fiscal policies on the dynamics of
the estimated underground economy by using orthogonalized impulse response
functions to shocks in the main variables, with the final goal of testing the model
implications.
Concerning the available methods for estimating the underground economy,
the most important problem comes from the fact that the underground eco-
nomic activities are not observable by definition. This is the main cause that
explains the existence of several and different approaches used to estimate the
informal economy. As emphasized by Schneider (2014), Jime´nez and Mart´ınez-
Pardo (2014) among others, we can distinguish between three main methods of
estimation: direct approaches, indirect approaches and model approaches.
• Direct approaches: this estimation method is based on microeconomic
approaches and tries to determine the size of the underground economy
by using survey data, but it has several important problems like the type
of questionnaires to be performed and the robustness of the individuals
answer, i.e. not all individuals are willing to say that they are working
in the underground sector. It is also important to note that this type
of approach requires large samples to estimate the size of the shadow
economy, which implies an important cost. No estimates are available
for Spain using this method, due to the absence of data. However, it has
been carried out for other countries like Denmark in the paper by Pedersen
(2003).
• Indirect approaches: These methods are based on macroeconomic mag-
nitudes and data of the market economy that are used as a proxies to
estimate the size of the underground economy and its trend. As in the
paper by Jime´nez and Mart´ınez-Pardo (2013), they try to estimate an
unobservable variable by using the behavior of others variables that are
observables and some condition about the relationship between the ob-
servable variables and the unobservable variables. Within this approach
there are several method that has been used for estimating the Spanish
Underground economy (see Arrazola et al. (2011), but the most important
ones are the currency demand approach and the physical input method:
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– The currency demand approach was presented by Cagan (1958) and
it is based on the idea that the underground economy uses a legal
payment method. Therefore, there exists a relationship between the
currency demand and the underground economy. The main criti-
cism to this method is that not all transactions in the underground
economy are done with legal payment method (Schneider and Buehn
(2013)).
– The physical input (electricity consumption) method uses inputs con-
sumed in the production process to estimate the volume of shadow
economy. Electricity consumption is the most common variable used
to estimate the irregular production because it is pretty easy to mea-
sure its demand. However, it is obvious that not all the production
processes need electricity as a significant input (Schneider and Buehn
(2013)).
Finally, there is another type of estimation approach, which is based in
econometrics models and statistical tools that are combined with the final goal
of estimating the shadow economy as a latent variable. Therefore, since I’m
using a model to infer the dynamic of the underground production, the bayesian
estimation of the two sector DSGE model that I implement in this paper belong
to this type of approach. This approach is called the model approach and among
its estimation methods we can highlight the Multiple Indicators and Multiple
Causes method (MIMIC) and the of DSGE model estimation (Kireenko and
Nevzorova (2015)). First, regarding to the MIMIC method, it uses a set of
observable variables that cause movements in the latent variable (underground
economy) and a set of observable indicators that are influenced by the size of the
underground economy. Also, this is one of the most used method for estimating
the Spanish underground economy. However, as Helberger and Knepel (1988)
and Va´zquez et al. (2010) pointed out, it has some limitations: the instability
of the coefficients when the sample size or the model specification change, it is
difficult and costly to obtain data from the causal variables and the reliability
of the variables and indicators used in the estimation process.
Secondly, the methods that use Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
models to estimate the informal economy are based, as pointed out by Kireenko
and Nevzorova (2015), on the assumption of rational behavior of agents which
solves maximization problems. More precisely, Orsi et al. (2013) apply this
methodology for the Italian economy highlighting its potential capability in an-
alyzing fiscal and economic policies. They study whether the actual corporate
tax rate and household income tax rate are efficient in order to propose fiscal
policies that are welfare improving. They found that the Italian fiscal system
was using an inefficient tax rate for both, corporate taxes and household in-
come taxes, and suggest that fiscal revenues may increase as a consequence of
a decrease in taxes.
I apply a two sector DSGE model following Orsi et al. (2013), under some
variations in the model specification, with the final goal of estimating the Span-
ish Underground economy and its dynamic. Also, I present a policy implication
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analysis regarding to the fiscal revenues of both, corporate taxation and house-
hold income taxation. I find that Spain can increase fiscal revenues by rising
corporate and household income tax rate. However, these policies are very
costly if we take into account the significant decrease of fiscal revenues that
come from social security contributions due to its importance in terms of social
welfare. This importance is due to the fact that social security contributions
are used to finance public pensions, unemployment benefits and others social
expenditures. On the other hand, I found that total fiscal revenues and social
security contributions may increase by rising the cost of supplying labor to the
underground sector without negative effects in other variables, which can be
done by increasing social benefits of working in the regular sector. My results
highlight the significance of taking into account indirect effects of fiscal policies
in order to select the most efficient one.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a detailed description
of the model and the optimality conditions. Section 3 describes the bayesian
estimation of the DSGE model and the data used. Also, it displays the prior
distributions of the estimated parameters and their resulting posterior distri-
butions. In Section 4 I carry on a robustness check of the estimated results
by estimating a different length of data. The Dynamics followed by the under-
ground production and its main components are described in Section 5, while
the main policy implications are exhibited in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 sum-
marizes the main conclusions of this study.
2 The model
I consider an extension of the DSGE model used by Orsi et al. (2013) which
consist in three different types of agents: households, firms and government. In
order to adapt the model for Spanish case, I have introduced some modifications
with respect to the original framework together with different assumptions about
the household’s utility and the law of motion.
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of homogeneous goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], each produced
by a perfectly competitive producer. Firms use two different Cobb-Douglass
production functions which differ in the type and the number of inputs used to
produce the same type of output. 3 The regular production function combines
regular labor hmt and physical capital kt to produce regular output according to
the following specification:
(1)ymi,t = At (Γth
m
i,t)
α k1−αi,t
3In contrast to the original model, I have avoid the existence of irregular capital in the
economy with the final goal of adapt the model to the Spanish economy case. This assumption
stems from the fact that the underground production is labor intensive and in most of the
cases it uses regular capital in the production process.
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where α is the regular labor elasticity and At is a purely transitory technological
shock that affects to the regular production. The regular production is taxed at
the corporate tax rate τ ct which follows an stochastic AR(1) process, but firms
can decide whether to produce using legal inputs or illegal inputs. In the last
case firms would use the irregular production function:
(2)yui,t = Bt (Γth
u
i,t)
αu
where αu and Bt refer to the irregular labor elasticity and a purely transitory
technological shock that affects to the irregular production. Note that both,
regular and irregular production functions, incorporate labor-augmenting tech-
nological process of the form Γt = τΓt−1 with τ > 1 which is included in order
to ensure a balanced growth path equilibrium in which variables grow at the
same rate τ .
As in Orsi et al (2013) and Busato and Chiarini (2004), I assume that goods
produced in the underground economy are identical to those produced in the
market economy. Therefore, we can normalize prices to 1 and total production
of firm i at time t lead as follows:
(3)yi,t = y
m
i,t + y
u
i,t
Accordingly to this specification, cost of production consist of capital and
regular labor in the case in which firms use the regular production function,
and irregular labor in the homologous case. As a result, total cost function is
as follows:
TCi,t = (1 + τ
s
t )w
m
t h
m
i,t + rtki,t + w
u
t h
u
i,t
where τst is the social security tax rate and rt is the rental rate of capital
from the official production. The cost of labor in the regular market is given
by the regular wage, wmt , plus a social security contribution per worker. In
the irregular production case, labor cost comes from irregular wages, wut , per
unit of irregular labor without taxation. Firms are discovered to evade with a
probability pt, and subject in this case to pay the evaded taxes plus a penalty
surcharge factor s > 1. We can then summarize the profit function as:
Et{Πi,t} = (1− τ ct )ymi,t + (1− ptsτ ct )yui,t + τ ct wmt hmi,t
−[(1 + τst )wmt hmi,t + rmt kmi,t + wut hui,t + rut kui,t]
Here, I have adopted a different assumption with respect to the model in
Orsi et al. (2013). In the original model, irregular labor was deductible in the
case of inspection, i.e. a firm that commits tax fraud and is inspected, irregular
labor costs can be deducted. This consideration is unrealistic for the Spanish
case because the irregular labor is not a legally accounted cost and therefore, it
cannot be deduced.
Firms choose ki,t, h
m
i,t and h
u
i,t to maximize expected profits given the pro-
duction functions. Hence the firm’s maximization problem is:
max
{hmi,t,hui,t,ki,t}
Et{Πi,t}
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s.t.
ymi,t = At (Γth
m
i,t)
α k1−αi,t
yui,t = Bt (Γth
u
i,t)
αu
The optimal decision for ki,t, h
m
i,t and h
u
i,t are given by the following first
order conditions:
(4)(1− α) y
m
i,t
ki,t
=
rt
1− τ ct
(5)α
ymi,t
hmi,t
=
wmt (1 + τ
s
t − τ ct )
1− τ ct
(6)αu
yui,t
hui,t
=
wut
1− τ ct pt s
Since τ ct ∈ (0, 1), the condition that satisfies an interior solution with the
existence of underground production in the firm’s maximization problem is (1−
τ ct pts) > 0. Otherwise, (1 − τ ct pts) ≤ 0 implies hut = 0 and therefore, no
underground production in the economy.
2.2 Representative Household
The representative household has preferences described by the following inter-
temporal utility function:
Uht =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0{ ((ct − γcct−1)/Γt)
(1−σ)
1− σ −B0ξ
h
t
(hmt + h
u
t )
1+ξ
1 + ξ
−B1 (h
u
t )
1+φ
1 + φ
}
where σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, B0,B1 ≥ 0 are parameters controlling for the
disutility of working activities, ξ is the inverse labor supply elasticity of aggre-
gate labor supply and φ is the inverse labor supply elasticity of underground
labor supply. Also, ξht is a purely transitory labor shock that affects labor sup-
ply. The third component of the utility function refers to an additional cost due
to work in the underground production sector, it can be interpreted as a greater
disutility associated with the lack of social security.
According to this utility specification, households derive utility from a quasi-
difference between current consumption and past consumption relative to the
rate of technology Γt. The habit formation specification implies that an increase
in current consumption increases the utility in the current period but decreases
utility in the next period. Fuhrer (2000) among others has found that this as-
sumption about household’s consumption improves the model solution because
it allows to capture into the model the observed gradual hump-shaped response
of consumption expenditures to different shocks and particularly, Smets and
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Wouters (2007) and Adolfson et al. (2007) have found that the introduction of
habit formation improves model fit to the data in bayesian estimation of DSGE
models.
Households rent the capital they own according to the following law of mo-
tion:
(7)kt+1 = xt ξ
x
t Ψ(xt/xt−1) + (1− δ) kt
where δ and ξxt are the capital depreciation rate and a purely transitory
investment shock that follows an AR(1) process around its steady-sate. Capital
adjustment cost are specified as follows:
Ψ(xt/xt−1) = 1− ψ
2
(
xt
xt−1
− 1)2
Note that this function depends negatively on the investment growth rate
and the adjustment cost parameter ψ, i.e. the higher is the investment increase
with respect to the previous period the lower is the capital adjustment cost that
affects current investment. The implementation of the capital adjustment cost
in the law of motion has the final goal of reduce investment volatility and as
signalled by Neri (2004), it helps the model in matching some key characteristics
of the data.
Like companies, households might evade income taxes by allocating their
labor services in the underground production sector. Income derived from pro-
duction in the regular market will be taxed at the income tax rate τht . Consid-
ering all this information, households’ period-by-period budget constraint will
be:
(8)xt + ct =
(
1− τht
)
(hmt w
m
t + rt kt) + h
u
t w
u
t
The utility maximization problem for the representative household can be
described as follows:
max
{ct,kmt ,hmt ,hut }∞t=0
E0{Uht }
s.t.
kt+1 = xt ξ
x
t Ψ(xt/xt−1) + (1− δ) kt
xt + ct =
(
1− τht
)
(hmt w
m
t + rt kt) + h
u
t w
u
t
The solution to this problem must satisfy the following conditions:
(9)λt = (ct − γc ct−1)(−σ) − γcβEt{ (ct+1 − ct γc)(−σ)}
(10)µt = βEt{
(
λt+1
(
1− τht+1
)
rt+1 + (1− δ) µt+1
)}
(11)
λt = ξ
x
t µt
(
1−
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)2
ψ
2
− xt
xt−1
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)
ψ
)
+ βEt{ ψ µt+1 ξxt+1
(
xt+1
xt
− 1
) (
xt+1
xt
)2
}
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(12)ξht B0 h
ξ
t = w
m
t
(
1− τht
)
λt
(13)ξht B0 h
ξ
t +B1 h
uφ
t = w
u
t λt
where λt and µt are the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint and the
law of motion, respectively. Equations (10) and (11) denote the Euler equations
which controls for the intertemporal optimality conditions in the households’
problem. Equations (12) and (13) provides the optimal schedule for regular and
irregular labor.
2.3 Government
The government raises taxes in order to finance public expenditures, gt. For
simplicity, I assume that there is no public debt so that public expenditures are
determined on a balanced budget bases, that is:
gt = τ
h
t (w
m
t h
m
t + rtkt) + τ
c
t
∫ 1
0
[ymi,t − wmt hmi,t + ptsyui,t]di+ τst wmt
∫ 1
0
hmi,tdi
Accordingly, fiscal revenues from corporate taxation, household income and
social security contributions read as:
(14)Gct = τ
c
t
∫ 1
0
(
ymi,t − hmi,t wmt + yui,tpt s
)
di
(15)Ght = τ
h
t (h
m
t w
m
t + rt kt)
(16)Gst = τ
s
t
∫ 1
0
(hmi,t w
m
t )di
In addition, total fiscal revenues can be defined as:
(17)FRt = G
s
t +G
h
t +G
c
t
Finally, tax evasion in period t can be defined as follows:
TEt = τ
s
t w
u
t
∫ 1
0
hui,tdi+ τ
h
t w
u
t h
u
t + (1− pt)τ ct
∫ 1
0
yui,tdi
2.4 Stochastic Shocks and equilibrium conditions
As mentioned before variables At, Bt, τ
c
t , τ
h
t , τ
s
t , pt, ξ
h
t and ξ
x
t follow an stochas-
tic VAR(1) process of the form:
Zt = (1− Φ)Z + ΦZt−1 + t
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where Zt = (ln(At), ln(Bt), ln(τ
c
t ), ln(τ
h
t ), ln(τ
s
t ), ln(pt), ln(ξ
h
t ), ln(ξ
x
t )), Z con-
tains mean values of the stochastic variables, Φ = diag(ρa, ρb, ρc, ρh, ρs, ρp, ρξh , ρξh)
and t = (
a
t , 
a
t , 
b
t , 
c
t , 
h
t , 
s
t , 
p
t , 
ξh
t , 
ξx
t ) is the vector of stochastic shocks which
follows a zero mean normal distribution with diagonal variance covariance ma-
trix Σ = diag(σ2a, σ
2
b , σ
2
c , σ
2
h, σ
2
s , σ
2
p, σ
2
ξh , σ
2
ξx). I consider a symmetric equilibria
with a continuum of identical firms that produce the same amount of goods and
use the same amount of inputs. Therefore, the market clearing conditions read
as follows:
ct + xt + gt =
∫ 1
0
yi,tdi
hut =
∫ 1
0
hui,tdi h
m
t =
∫ 1
0
hmi,tdi
kt =
∫ 1
0
ki,tdi
3 Bayesian Estimation of the Model
The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using mixed frequency data on
consumption ct, investment xt, regular wages wt, fiscal revenues from corporate
taxation Gct , social security contributions G
s
t , fiscal revenues from household
income taxation Ght , social security contributions tax rate τ
s
t and probability
of being inspected by the government pt for the period 1980:Q1-2015:Q4. I
use quarterly frequency for all the variables except for the probability of being
inspected and the social security contributions due to their annual definition.
Thus, the estimation is based in 144 quarterly observations and 36 annual ob-
servations.
In order to link the theoretical model with the real data, I have implemented
eight measurement equations according to the following structure:
Yt =

dlConst
dlInvt
dlWagest
dlFRct
dlFRst
dlFRht
lTaxst
lP robt

=

γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
ln(τsss)
ln(pss)

+

ln(ct)− ln(ct−1)
ln(xt)− ln(xt−1)
ln(wt)− ln(wt−1)
ln(Gct)− ln(Gct−1)
ln(Gst )− ln(Gst−1)
ln(Ght )− ln(Ght−1)
τˆst
pˆt

(18)
where dl and ln stand for log differences and log, respectively and variables with
hat refers to log deviations from their steady-state values.
The model is estimated using a Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) method.
Following Smets and Wouters (2003) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2001) the estimation procedure can be summarized in three steps. First, I
specify prior distributions over a set of structural parameters according to the
previous literature and the values of calibrated parameters using Spanish data.
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Second, I use Sims (2002) to find the mode of each estimated parameter in the
model. For the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm we need to start with a
high density point, parameters modes are those points with the highest density.
Third, I use the M-H algorithm and the Kalman filter with the final goal of
finding posterior distributions of the parameters that maximize the likelihood
function. The novelty of my estimation comes from the fact that I use mixed
frequency data by combining annual and quarterly variables, which allow my
to use annual variables without previous transformation. The software used in
the estimation is Dynare 4.4.3 launched on Matlab R2015b and the estimation
results are based on a Metropolis-Hastings procedure with 4 chains of 300000
replications.
3.1 Data, calibration and prior distributions
Data about consumption, investment, wages and fiscal revenues are provided by
the Quarterly Database of the Spanish Economy (BDREMS). All the variables
are deflated and expressed in per capita terms using the GDP deflator in 2010
base and dividing by the population aged 15-64 (working age population). The
selection of the observable variables clearly depends on the final goal of the
estimation. Since I want to estimate the size and trend of the Spanish shadow
economy, I have selected those available variables that are the most significant
to explain its behavior. In this regard, consumption and investment are used
to proxy for total production. Regular wages introduce information about the
labor market of the regular production sector.
Also, I have included fiscal revenues from corporate taxation, household
income taxation and social security contributions in order to control for the
incentives of both, firms and household, to produce in the irregular production
sector. In this regard, I include also the evolution of the social security tax rate
due to its importance in this model specification.
Finally, the estimation takes into account information about the dynamic of
the probability of being inspected by the government pt. This variable measures
risk of evading taxes. Since there is no available data about the real probabil-
ity of being inspected, I have construct this probability following Busato and
Chiarini (2004):
pt =
Inspected firmst
Total number of firmst
Data about the number of inspected firms and the total number of firms
come from the annual statistical reports of Agencia Tributaria (AETA). Note
that this data is only available for the period 1996-2015 and some years are
missing.
Bayesian estimation of DSGE models clearly depends on the elicitation of the
prior distributions, thus I have chosen priors that are based in previous studies
of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) for those parameters that are common in
these types of model. For the parameters regarding the underground production
I have set the priors distribution in line with Orsi et al. (2013). Therefore, the
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labor elasticity of the regular production α is distributed according to a beta
distribution with mean 0.65 and standard deviation 0.02. For the labor elasticity
of the underground sector αu, I have set the same distribution and standard
deviation with mean 0.42 in order to reproduce an underground production to
output ratio equals to 0.256, which is the estimated average of the Spanish
underground economy for the period 1991-2015 (Medina and Schneider (2017)).
The capital discount factor δ follows a beta distribution with a mean fixed at
0.010 to ensure a steady-state value of the discount factor β = 0.9927.
Regarding the parameters controlling for the household’s utility, I have cho-
sen gamma prior distributions with mean 1 and standard deviations 0.3 for the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ, the inverse elasticity of
total labor supply ξ, and the inverse elasticity of irregular labor supply φ. Since
this model specification uses habit formation I have set a gamma distribution
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.15 for the habit formation parameter
γc, a value commonly used in the literature (Havranek et al. (2016)). Also, the
disutility of working in the underground production sector B1 follows a gamma
prior distribution with mean 50 and standard deviation equals 5. The elicita-
tion of this prior together with the prior distribution of αu implies hu/h = 0.18
following Hazan (2011). Finally, the parameter controlling for the disutility of
total labor (B0) is updated at any iteration according to the following equation
to ensure that at the steady state individuals devote 1/4 of their time to working
activities:
B0 = (1− τhss)wmssλssh−ξss
As noted above, the estimation uses data in growth rates with the final goal
of using as much information as possible, thus the model needs a parameter
controlling for the common quarterly trend growth rate, τ . The distribution
of this parameter is normal with mean 1.003 which has been chosen according
to the average growth rate of GDP per capita for the period 1980:Q1-2015:Q4.
Furthermore, I estimate the steady-sate probability of being inspected pss and
social security tax rate τsss according to beta and gamma distributions with
the same standard deviation 0.01 and mean values equals to 0.015 and 0.2973,
respectively. The means of both parameters, pss and τ
s
ss, have been set in
line with the average value of the probability of being inspected and the social
security tax rate for the period 1980-2015.
For the AR(1) processes, there is no much information about the prior dis-
tributions of the persistence parameter for the Spanish economy, then I use a
beta distribution with a relatively large standard deviation in order to control
for a large range of possible values. All the persistence parameter distributions
are centered at a mean value of 0.8 and standard deviation 0.1. Finally, for the
exogenous processes at , 
a
t , 
b
t , 
c
t , 
h
t , 
s
t , 
p
t , 
ξh
t and 
ξx
t the mean values are set
in line with the priors used by Orsi et al. (2013).
The rest of the parameters are fixed at a certain value across the whole
estimation. More specifically, I have set the penalty that a firm has to pay in
case of tax fraud s at 1.875, which is in line with the Spanish law. Also, I have
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Table 3: Estimated Parameters
Density Prior Mean Prior Std. Posterior Mean 95% Confidence Inerval Posterior Std.
σA ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.001
σB ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.045 0.030 0.060 0.009
σc ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.001
σs ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.001
σh ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.024 0.021 0.026 0.001
σp ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.001
σξh ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.035 0.027 0.043 0.003
σξx ’Inv. Gamma’ 0.006 Inf 0.089 0.058 0.119 0.012
α ’Beta’ 0.650 0.020 0.704 0.679 0.729 0.015
αu ’Beta’ 0.420 0.020 0.416 0.384 0.448 0.020
δ ’Beta’ 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.001
ρA ’Beta’ 0.800 0.100 0.989 0.980 0.999 0.010
ρB ’Beta’ 0.800 0.100 0.964 0.948 0.980 0.011
ρc ’Beta’ 0.800 0.100 0.985 0.974 0.997 0.007
ρs ’Beta’ 0.800 0.100 0.964 0.941 0.988 0.016
ρh ’Beta’ 0.800 0.100 0.987 0.977 0.997 0.006
ρξx ’Beta’ 0.800 0.100 0.614 0.468 0.761 0.083
ρξh ’Gamma’ 0.800 0.100 0.963 0.939 0.990 0.018
τsss ’Beta’ 0.297 0.010 0.299 0.291 0.307 0.004
pss ’Beta’ 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.001
σ ’Gamma’ 1.000 0.300 1.081 0.778 1.382 0.198
B1 ’Gamma’ 50.000 5.000 51.702 43.270 59.779 64.736
ξ ’Gamma’ 1.000 0.300 2.059 1.413 2.687 0.276
φ ’Gamma’ 1.000 0.300 0.500 0.273 0.716 0.222
ψ ’Gamma’ 3.000 0.600 3.755 2.629 4.853 0.480
τ ’Normal’ 1.003 0.003 1.002 1.001 1.003 0.001
γc ’Gamma’ 0.500 0.150 0.478 0.368 0.591 0.073
computed the steady-state value for the corporate tax rate and the household
income tax rate using the data from the OECD tax database as an average
for the period 1980-2015, the resultant values are τ c = 0.3376 and τh = 0.19,
respectively.
3.2 Posterior distributions
Table 3 summarizes the prior distributions of the parameters (columns 1-3)
along with their estimated posterior distributions. More precisely, it shows the
posterior mean along with the 95 percent credible interval and the posterior
standard deviation for each estimated parameter (columns 3-6). Also, in fig-
ures 1A and 2A in the Appendix we can see a graphical representation of this
parameters prior information and their corresponding estimated posterior distri-
butions. Relative to the estimated parameters identification, most parameters
seems to be well-identified because the posterior distribution is not centered on
the prior mean or it is centered at the prior mean but there is a relatively low
dispersion, which means that the prior elicitation is close to the ’real’ estimated
parameter Forni et al. (2009).
In particular, the regular labor elasticity is estimated somewhat higher than
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what assumed a priori, which means that regular production is more labor
sensitive than what is suggested by the a priori information. For the irregular
labor elasticity, the estimated posterior mean implies a slightly reduction of the
prior mean to the value 0.4159 with a lower standard deviation. There is no
change in the capital depreciation rate and in the probability of being inspected
with respect to the prior standard deviation, but in both cases there is an small
change in the posterior mean which shows some evidence of identification. The
parameter controlling for the steady-state social security tax rate τs is strongly
identified with a posterior mean equals to 0.2994, as it is shown by the significant
reduction in its standard deviation.
Among AR(1) processes, persistence parameters have been well identified
because as in the previous cases the posterior means is significantly different
from their a priori mean and vary between 0.96 and 0.99 with the exception of
ρx, as in the paper by Casares et al. (2016). The same happens for the variance
of the exogenous processes, all of them are clearly well identified.
Relating to the parameters affecting the household problem, the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ shows a posterior mean larger than
the a priori mean and a lower standard deviation, implying an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution lower than 1. For parameter B1 which is the extra
disutility of underground working activities the estimation shows identification
problems due to an increase of its standard deviation and a similar posterior
mean. The inverse elasticity of aggregate labor supply (ξ )and the inverse elastic-
ity of underground labor supply (φ) display a proper identification with clearly
different posterior means and lower standard deviations. The estimated mean
values for these parameters imply that labor supply in the underground produc-
tion sector is much more sensitive to changes in the wage rate than labor supply
in the regular labor market. This result is consistent with the bayesian estima-
tion of the model implemented by Orsi et al. (2013) for the Italian economy, but
the Spanish case shows a larger difference between this two parameter, suggest-
ing that the underground production sector in Spain is more sensitive than the
its Italian counterpart to movements in the wage rate. For the habit formation
parameter γc, I found a posterior mean equals 0.4776 which is relatively similar
to the prior mean and it is in line with other estimations (Havranek (2016).
Finally, parameters controlling for the labor augmenting technological progress
(τ) and the capital adjustment cost (φ) seem to be also well identified.
4 Robustness Check
In this section I elaborate a simple test to check the robustness of the estimated
results presented above. More precisely, I estimate the model with a different
length of data to test whether the estimated results change significantly. The
main reason to conduct such a robustness test is given by the huge increase in
volatility that occurs during the financial crisis that started at the end of 2007.
From the last quarter of 2007 there is an important increase in the variability of
the series that I use in the bayesian estimation. Since I am assuming constant
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Figure 1: Growth Rates
variances in the bayesian estimation and in the Kalman filter, this increase in
the variance of the data can reduce estimates reliability as is shown by McConell
and Perez-Quirs (1998). Therefore, I estimate the model for the period 1980:Q1-
2007:Q3 in order to study the effects of the financial crisis in the estimation
results.
The estimation was carried out with the same priors distributions of the
parameters and the same scale parameter. For the mode computation I used
Sims (2002) algorithm as in the previous estimation and results are based in
a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with 4 chains of 300000 replications. Table 4
presents posterior means and posterior standard deviations of both, benchmark
estimation and the estimation based on the sub-period 1980:Q1-2007:Q3.
Overall, results confirm the benchmark findings in terms of both, poste-
rior means and posterior standard deviations. More precisely, variances of the
exogenous processes are larger for the estimation based in the whole period,
which is pretty obvious if we take into account the variation in the data, but
the differences do not appear to be important for the model estimation since
the estimated dynamic of the underground production does not change signifi-
cantly. The labor elasticities of regular and irregular production and the capital
depreciation rate are almost the same and this happens also with the posterior
standard deviations, which shows a robust estimation of these parameters. For
the persistence parameters of the exogenous processes I did not find a consider-
able difference between the posterior means except for ρξx . This result is clearly
due to the huge increase in the variation of investment growth rates, which in
2009 reach quarterly growth rates of more than −12%, as it is shown in figure
1. The most appreciable difference occurs in the case of the household utility
parameters, whose estimates turn out to be significantly different with respect
to the benchmark specification. For the inverse elasticity of substitution there
is an important difference, which shows that, using the new length of data, con-
sumption is less sensitive to movements in the real interest rate with respect to
the previous estimation. These increase of the inverse elasticity of substitution
σ could be due to the increase in consumption variability in the aftermath of
16
Table 4: Robustness Check
Posterior Mean Posterior Standard Deviation
Benchmark Model 1980:Q1-2007:Q3 Benchmark Model 1980:Q1-2007:Q3
σA 0.010 0.009 0.001 0.001
σB 0.045 0.030 0.009 0.009
σc 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.001
σs 0.017 0.012 0.001 0.001
σh 0.024 0.023 0.001 0.001
σp 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001
σξh 0.035 0.028 0.003 0.005
σξx 0.089 0.079 0.012 0.018
α 0.704 0.695 0.015 0.015
αu 0.416 0.420 0.020 0.020
δ 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001
ρA 0.989 0.971 0.010 0.004
ρB 0.964 0.957 0.011 0.010
ρc 0.985 0.990 0.007 0.007
ρs 0.964 0.961 0.016 0.015
ρh 0.987 0.991 0.006 0.006
ρξx 0.614 0.686 0.083 0.087
ρξh 0.963 0.962 0.018 0.018
τsss 0.299 0.300 0.004 0.005
pss 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.001
σ 1.081 1.253 0.198 0.208
B1 51.702 50.630 6.474 5.020
ξ 2.059 1.663 0.276 0.383
φ 0.500 0.716 0.222 0.136
ψ 3.755 3.338 0.480 0.665
τ 1.002 1.005 0.001 0.001
γc 0.478 0.371 0.073 0.076
the crisis. Also, results changes for the regular labor supply elasticity and the
irregular labor supply elasticity suggesting that the sensitivity of both, regular
and irregular labor, to changes in the wage rate it is closer than in the bench-
mark estimation. However, these results have very similar implications for the
model and the dynamic of the main variables remains almost equal. Finally,
for the cost of supplying labor to the irregular production and the parameter
driving the capital adjustment cost I found very similar estimates.
Overall, this robustness check shows a pretty good estimation of the DSGE
model as it is corroborated by most of the posterior means and standard devi-
ations of the parameters.
5 Dynamics of the Underground Economy in
Spain
In this section I present estimates of the underground economy in Spain over
the period 1980:Q1-2015:Q4, with the aim of understanding the main driving
forces behind the predicted dynamics. Also, this section presents a description
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Figure 2: Underground to Output Ratio
Figure 2: Smoothed estimates of the Underground to output ratio (blue line) together with the
95% confidence interval (green dashed lines).
of the main business cycle statistics with the final goal of understanding the
behavior of the estimated model.
Figure 2 shows the smoothed estimates of the irregular production as a
fraction of total output along with the 95 percent confidence interval for the
estimated period. I found a large variability in the size of the Spanish shadow
economy, ranging from to a minimum of 16% to a maximum of about 35%. In
particular, the model predicts that between 1980-1989 there is a complete cycle
in which the underground economy starts at a 30% of the total production, then
it decreases up to the 20% level in 1984 and comes back to the starting point in
the following five years. Second, an important decrease occurs between the years
1990 and 1994 leaving the underground economy at the lowest level (16%) in the
analyzed years. From this point there is a long process of growth that lasts up to
2007, a total of 13 years, which situates its level of importance in more than 35%
over the total production, and it is followed by a significant reduction that ends
in the last quarter of 2008. Finally, notice that there is a considerable increase
in the irregular production to output ratio that occurs during the financial
crisis (2007). As a matter of fact, after a substantial decrease at the beginning
of the crisis, the size of the underground has substantially increased (about 5
percentage points) in all the subsequential periods. This result is consistent
with Gestha (2014), which estimates an important increase of the underground
economy since 2008.
In order to explain the dynamics of the underground economy, I next study
the factors that affects its variation. To this end, I present the historical shock
decomposition of the Spanish shadow economy for the considered period in per-
centage deviations from the steady-state (Figure 3), to disentangle the relative
contribution of shocks to the dynamic of the estimated underground produc-
tion. This variations are determined by the estimated stochastic innovations
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Figure 3: Historical Decomposition
Figure 2: Historical decomposition of the underground production. The productivity component
includes productivity shock of both regular and irregular sector. The taxes factor includes shocks
regarding social security contribution tax rate, corporate tax rate and household income tax rate.
Labor and Investment component refers to labor and investment shocks while the control
component includes the probability of being inspected.
that are specified in the model, which in the picture have been summarized
into productivity, labor and investment, taxes and control components. The
first one refers to the changes in the shadow economy that comes from changes
in productivity of both regular and irregular sector (At and Bt) and, as the
picture illustrates, is the most important factor in explaining the variations in
the underground production. Most likely, this result is driven by the positive
consumption-underground production relationship. The intuition is straightfor-
ward. When the economy experiences a boost in productivity, consumption and
output both increase and therefore firms uses more irregular labor to produce in
order to avoid payment of taxes. Conversely, since firms have to pay corporate
tax profits net of labor costs and irregular labor is not deductible, it is very likely
that firms find unprofitable to produce underground output in recession, thus
explaining why I found an important decrease in the size of the underground
economy when there is a significant contraction in consumption.
This interpretation is supported by the orthogonalized impulse response
functions to a shocks in both, regular and irregular productivity. On the one
hand, Figure 10 in the Appendix shows that a positive shock in regular produc-
tivity produces a contraction in the irregular production and therefore, in the
ratio of underground economy and tax evasion. On the other hand, a positive
shock in the underground productivity originates an increase in total produc-
tion and irregular production, while it generates a negative response of regular
output, as it is shown in Figure 11. Relating to this, the decrease in the under-
ground economy ratio in case of a regular productivity shock is driven by two
negative effects, the total output increase and the irregular production decrease,
while the increase in the underground ratio due to a irregular productivity shock
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Figure 4: Underground Production & Taxes
Figure 4: Smoothed estimates of underground production and Taxes component. Note that the
two series are plotted in different axes.
depends on both total output negative effect and irregular production positive
effect. This result is due to the composition of the underground economy ratio,
which depends positively on yu and negatively on y. Thus, since in case of a
regular productivity shock there is a rise in y and a reduction in yu the under-
ground ratio decreases by more than the reduction in the irregular production,
whereas the increase in this ratio is lower than the rise in underground output
when there is an irregular productivity shock.
Coming back to the historical decomposition of the underground produc-
tion, labor and investment shocks and the probability of being inspected do not
explain a significant portion of the variation in the irregular production. There-
fore, the remaining differences between the variance of the productivity shocks
and the smoothed estimate of the irregular production can be explained by the
variation in taxes. Regarding to this, Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the tax
factor together with the underground production, showing that the two series
are in general negatively correlated. To explain these findings, in Figures 12-14
(see the appendix) I report the response of the economy to a temporary increase
in tax rates. As the pictures illustrate, an increase in each tax rate produces
a contraction in total production yt, regular production y
m
t , consumption ct
and investment xt among others, while it produces a rise in irregular labor h
u
t ,
and therefore in the underground production yut . Therefore, since the ratio of
underground economy (yut /yt) depends positively on irregular production and
negatively on total production, it increases by more than the expansion in the
irregular economy. This is the so called resource reallocation effect, which has
been emphasized in previous studies by Orsi et al. (2013) and Basile et al.
(2012) among others. More precisely and since the model specification takes
into account labor as the unique input in the underground production, this
could be denominated labor reallocation effect, which in this case transfers la-
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bor from the regular to the irregular production. Notice that this reallocation
effect is larger when the increase in tax rate affects personal income (shock on
τh) than with a shock in τ c or τs, which is due to the change in the individual
preferences that are more affected by the household income tax rate. Also, it is
important to take into account the variation in tax evasion (TE) when there is a
shock in any of the taxes. As we can see in the orthogonalized impulse response
function to shocks in any of the taxes, there is an expansion in tax evasion for
all the cases, which is consistent with the results in Orsi et al. (2013) and Jung
and Trandel (1994) among others, and highlights the importance of taking into
account the existence of tax evasion when choosing proper fiscal policies. In
Section 6 I implement a fiscal policy analysis with the final goal of emphasizing
the importance of this issue.
Concerning the dynamic of the economy with the existence of irregular sec-
tor, it is important to analyze the main business cycle statistics in order to
understand the mechanism that describe its behavior. In table 6, I present
standard deviations, correlation coefficients with respect to irregular output
(yu) and autocorrelation coefficients for each variable. Two main results are
worth emphasizing. First, as noted before irregular output turns is much more
volatile than regular output, being the standard deviation of the former about
4 time higher than the standard deviation of regular output. This finding mir-
rors volatilities in labor variables, suggesting that regular labor is less sensitive
than the irregular one to the business cycle.These results also implies that the
regular labor market is less sensitive than the irregular labor market. Second,
the estimated results provide evidence in favor of a double business cycle in the
Spanish economy, being regular and irregular production negatively correlated.
The countercyclical nature of the underground economy is also supported by the
negative correlation with regular inputs and fiscal revenues, as those variables
move instead procyclically.
6 Policy Implications
This section conducts a fiscal policy analysis, in which I evaluate the steady-
state Laffer curve for corporate tax rate and household income tax rate in an
economy with and without underground sector. The model specification in the
case in which there is no irregular sector is similar to the one explained in section
2, and I use the same estimated parameters for both economies. This analysis
is carried out with the final goal of highlighting the importance of taking into
account the importance of the underground economy in the implementation of
fiscal policies. In this section I give an special importance to the effects of those
fiscal policies over social security contributions due to its importance in social
welfare.
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Table 5: Business Cycle Statistics
Standard Deviation Correlation (yu) % Autocorrelation (1) %
y 0.0195 69.89 80.60
ym 0.0199 -39.43 77.50
yu 0.0821 100.00 72.83
hm 0.0212 -46.69 74.69
hu 0.0587 95.83 73.21
h 0.0178 -23.16 76.68
k 0.0063 0.26 95.03
wm 0.0141 13.90 68.84
wu 0.0308 83.77 63.63
c 0.0181 32.50 81.26
x 0.0837 16.11 88.29
Gh 0.0365 -19.30 72.62
Gs 0.0215 -36.05 76.40
Gc 0.0302 -18.12 73.72
FR 0.0224 -30.65 75.04
TE 0.0834 98.79 72.69
Ratio 0.0698 97.98 71.83
Table 5: This table presents estimates for standard deviation, correlation with irregular
production and first order autocorrelation for the main variables in the model. Estimated results
are based on a stochastic simulation with the parameters fixed at their posterior mean values and
using Hp-filtered variables.
6.1 Corporate Tax Rate
Figure 5 presents the corporate tax rate steady-state Laffer curve for both,
the benchmark model and the model without underground production. The
curves take into account total fiscal revenues for each value of τ c keeping all the
remaining parameters fixed to their posterior mean values. The vertical straight
line depicts the steady-state value of corporate tax rate computed as the average
tax rate for the period 1980-2015. Also, I present the response of fiscal revenues
from social security contributions and a sensitivity analysis in which there is an
increase in the utility cost of supplying labor into the underground sector (B1).
First, the estimated model predicts that Spain is in the left hand side of
the optimal corporate tax rate for both model specification, the benchmark
and the model without irregular production. 4 It shows that it is possible to
increase total fiscal revenues by rising corporate tax rate. However, I found that
the increase in corporate tax rate has negatives effects on fiscal revenues that
comes from social security contributions, which generates a decrease in social
security contributions that are used to finance social benefits. More precisely,
4This result is similar to the estimated Laffer curves in Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) and
Busato and Chiarini (2013) for Italy and US, respectively.
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Figure 5: Steady-State Laffer Curve (Corporate Taxation)
Figure 5: This picture shows the steady-state Laffer curve for the benchmark case, the complete
enforcement case and fixing B1 at twice the estimated value as a function of corporate tax rate τ
c.
Green bars refers to social security fiscal revenues. All the other parameters are kept fixed to their
posterior mean values.
this negative effect produces an important increase in social security tax evasion
as can be observed in figure 6, which is primarily due to the expansion in
underground production that occurs with higher corporate tax rate.
The mechanism that drives this effect is illustrated in the orthogonalized
impulse response function to a shock in τ c (figure 12 in the appendix). A
positive shock in corporate tax rate produces an increase in corporate fiscal
revenues and due to the labor reallocation effect there is an important reduction
in regular labor, which goes to the irregular production. However, as we can see
the reduction in regular labor is lower than the increase in underground labor.
This happens because, since firms pay corporate taxes net of labor costs the
rise in corporate tax rate produces an increase in the relative price of producing
using capital. Therefore, the expansion of the irregular production is due to two
effects: 1) labor reallocation effect and 2) capital effect, firms produce more using
labor instead of capital. The irregular production definition which uses labor as
the unique input, reproduce this result because in contrast to the original model
in Orsi et al. (2013) there is no capital counterpart in the irregular sector that
firms can use in order to avoid corporate taxes.
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Notice that the optimal corporate tax rate that maximize fiscal revenues in
the full enforcement economy would instead lead the economy with underground
sector to the slippery slope side of the Laffer curve, resulting therefore in a
decline of fiscal revenues. This finding clearly highlights the importance of
taking into account the underground sector and tax evasion in the fiscal policy
design. The estimated increase in fiscal revenues due to a rise in the tax rate
is also larger than in the previous case, which means that is more likely that
the government rise taxes. Furthermore, the effects of a variation in total fiscal
revenues must be taken into account, but also the reaction of fiscal revenues
and tax evasion that comes from other taxes. In this case the marginal increase
of rising the corporate tax rate is very low and the negative effects over social
security fiscal revenues and its tax evasion must be considered.
The parameterB1 refers to the extra cost that the individual has to assume in
order to supply labor in the irregular production sector. Although in the model
this parameter is a primitive parameter reflecting the household willingness
to work in the underground sector, it can be more in general interpreted as
controlling for those elements that are left unspecified in the model such as the
quality of institutions, culture elements (tax morality), labor market policy and
enforcement legislation. All these elements might be affected by the government
through properly oriented policies. An example of these type of interventions
are policies on social benefits, which might affect the willingness of household to
work in the underground sector. In this respect, we then conduct a sensitivity
analysis by testing how the predictions of the model change by setting parameter
B1 twice as larger than its estimated posterior mean. Results are provided in
Figure 5 for the estimated Laffer curve and in Figure 6, which displays the effect
of a higher B1 to the evasion in social security contributions. As the picture
illustrate, at actual tax rate there is a significant improve in fiscal revenues
associated with a decline in tax evasion from social security contributions. This
is a very interesting result because it means that the government can increase
fiscal revenues reducing tax evasion without negative effects over other taxes. In
addition, optimal fiscal revenues can be achieved by implementing positive fiscal
policies that improves household welfare. In this regard, it is possible to achieve
optimal fiscal revenues by rising the disutility of working in the irregular sector
B1 from 51.7 to 53, without negative effects on social security contributions and
tax evasion.
6.2 Household Income Tax Rate
As in the previous subsection, figure 7 presents the estimated steady-state Laffer
curve for the benchmark model, the model without underground sector and the
steady-state Laffer curve with a new value of B1. Also, as before it depicts
fiscal revenues that comes from social security tax rate with the final goal of
analyzing the effects of a variation in household income tax rate. The vertical
straight line represents the steady-state tax rate value.
It is obvious that fiscal revenues are always lower in the benchmark econ-
omy than in the economy without tax evasion because agents can avoid income
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Figure 6: Social Security Tax Evasion
Figure 6: This figure shows the level of tax evasion for both the benchmark case and the case with
B∗1 as a function of τ
c.
taxes by reallocating capital and labor from the regular to the irregular sector.
Results in figure 7 shows that there is a clear difference between the optimal
tax rate that maximizes fiscal revenues in the benchmark model and the model
without underground economy. This difference is even larger than in the case
of corporate tax rate, which may results in greater efficiency looses.
As a simple example I consider a scenario in which, taking an economy
with irregular sector, the government sets the household income tax rate at
the complete enforcement optimal level τh = 0.59. According to the model
estimation, total fiscal revenues would be 18 percentage points lower than the
optimal fiscal revenues in the benchmark economy. This result exhibits the
relevance of the information that appears when there is tax evasion in selecting
suitable fiscal policies.
As in the case of corporate tax rate, an important reduction in social security
fiscal revenues occurs when there is a rise in the income tax rate, showing that
taxes affects the individual willingness of working in the underground production
sector. My findings suggest that it is possible to increase total fiscal revenues by
rising household income tax rate from 0.19 to 0.34, resulting in a quantitatively
important positive change of almost 5 percentage points more. However, this
rise in taxes affects negatively to the social security budget by reducing its fiscal
revenues by 14 percentage points.
Finally, the sensitivity analysis over B1, in which the cost of suppling labor
to the irregular market is twice the original estimated value, shows that it is
possible to reach the optimal quantity of fiscal revenues. More precisely, by
doubling the value of B1 fiscal revenues increases in the same quantity than in
the case of optimal taxation, without negative effects in social security contri-
butions and tax evasion. Therefore, this result suggest that increasing the cost
of supplying labor to the irregular production sector is pareto optimal in terms
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Figure 7: Steady-State Laffer Curve (Household Income)
Figure 7: This picture shows the steady-state Laffer curve for the benchmark case, the complete
enforcement case and fixing B1 at twice the estimated value as a function of corporate tax rate
τh. Green bars refers to social security fiscal revenues. All the other parameters are kept fixed to
their posterior mean values.
of fiscal revenues, while increasing household income tax rate affects negatively
to social security contributions and may decrease social welfare.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented an estimation of the Spanish underground econ-
omy along with the main variables that explain its variation for the period
1980:Q1-2015:Q4. I found that its size has a widely variance ranging between
16% and more than 35% of the total output, due to its dependence on the la-
bor market. Since the irregular production uses labor as the unique input in
the production process, it cannot use capital as an alternative to unproduc-
tive labor, i.e. whenever labor is unproductive the unique way to avoid this
unproductiveness is to increase regular production. This result could explain
the substantial increase after the beginning of the financial crisis because the
fall in wages produces a higher labor productivity, which means that firms have
incentives to avoid corporate taxes by hiring more irregular labor.
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Regarding to the fiscal policy analysis, I found that the Spanish government
can increase fiscal revenues by rising both corporate and household income tax
rate. However, as noted above increasing taxes generates negative effects on
social security contributions, which may damage social welfare. Therefore, it
is important to take into account these negative effects in order to achieve
the optimal fiscal policy. On this matter, I present a sensitivity analysis over
the cost of supplying labor to the irregular sector B1 in which this parameter
doubles its value showing a significant increase on fiscal revenues. As noted
above, this rise in the cost parameter could be due to different policies but also
it is possible to achieve the same result by reducing the cost of supplying total
labor B0 relative to B1. This means that the government can reduce the size
of the irregular production sector, and therefore tax evasion by implementing
policies that affects positively the household utility and without negative effects
on social security contributions.
These results shows another perspective for reducing the size of the under-
ground economy, and presents new research topics focused in compute the effects
of those policies in the size of the informal sector.
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Figure 10: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function to a shock in At
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Figure 11: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function to a shock in Bt
Figure 12: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function to a shock in τc
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Figure 13: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function to a shock in τs
Figure 14: Orthogonalized Impulse Response Function to a shock in τh
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